

Message Text

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 4358

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: DEFINITION OF FORCES

REF: A. USNATO 4010 DTG 301720Z JUL 75

B. STATE 190298

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A NEW WORKING GROUP DRAFT STUDY ON FORCE REDUCTIONS (REVISING REF A) AS REVISED ON THE BASIS OF THE AUGUST 12 WG SESSION. THE US REP COMPLIMENTED THE WG ON ITS EFFORT AND MADE THE POINTS CONTAINED IN REF B. ALLIED REPS AGREED ESPECIALLY WITH THE COMMENT IN PARA 3 OF REF B THAT THIS WG STUDY REINFORCES EXISTING NAC GUIDANCE THAT THERE MUST BE AN UNDERSTANDING OF EACH SIDE'S DATA HOLDINGS BEFORE TAKING A FINAL POSITION ON DEFINITIONS.

2. THE US REP REQUESTED ANY FURTHER DATA THE UK MIGHT HAVE TO SUPPORT THE ESTIMATE THAT UP TO 30,000 GROUND SUPPORT PERSONNEL
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MIGHT BE ELIGIBLE TO SHIFT TO THE AIR FORCES UNDER A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION AS PROPOSED BY THE EAST (PARA 4, REF A). THE UK MOD REP (GERAHTY) SAID THAT FURTHER CHECKS HE HAD MADE WITH INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS IN LONDON REVEALED THAT THERE IS NO

SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORTING DATA AVAILABLE. HE THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT THE FIGURE BE MADE MORE VAGUE, FOR EXAMPLE, AS A RANGE OF "20,000 TO 30,000" (SEE PARA 23 BELOW).

3. THE WG WILL MEET AGAIN AUGUST 21 TO ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE A FINAL DRAFT OF THIS STUDY BEFORE THE SPC RETURNS TO WORK AUGUST 25.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST GUIDANCE PRIOR TO THE AUGUST 21 WG SESSION.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT STUDY ON FORCE REDUCTIONS

MBFR: DEFINITION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES

1. AT THEIR MEETING ON FRIDAY, 18 JULY, 1975, AFTER DISCUSSING A REPORT(1) BY THE AD HOC GROUP VIENNA ON THE COURSE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE PERIOD MAY 16 TO JULY 17, 1975, INCLUDING THE PROGRESS OF DISCUSSIONS ON A POSSIBLE DEFINITION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES, THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL INVITED THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DEFINITION AND TO UPDATE A PREVIOUS REPORT(2) INVOLVING SIMILAR POSSIBILITIES FOR DEFINITION OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR.

FOOTNOTES: (1) AGV (75)025 (2) AC/276-D(74)8

BACKGROUND

2. THE WARSAW PACT HAVE PROPOSED, IN VIENNA, A DEFINITION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES ON THE BASIS THAT ALL FORCES ON EACH SIDE WITH A SIMILAR FUNCTION BE PLACED IN THE SAME CATEGORY, EITHER GROUND OR AIR. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A DEFINITION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES BASED ON AN ENUMERATION OF FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF ROLES. SPECIFICALLY, THE WARSAW PACT HAVE SUGGESTED THAT:

A. ALL TERRITORIAL (I.E. AREA) AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO AIR FORCES.

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B. ALL HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE GROUND FORCES, WITH POSSIBLY SOME MINOR EXCEPTIONS. ALTERNATIVELY THEY SUGGESTED THAT ALL HELICOPTER PERSONNEL COULD BE COUNTED AS AIR FORCES, BUT THEY DID NOT PURSUE THIS ISSUE.

C. ALL TACTICAL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE PERSONNEL WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE GROUND FORCES.

3. IT IS FURTHER NOTED THAT THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS WOULD ENTAIL INCLUSION IN AIR FORCES OF, INTER ALIA "FORCES OF COMBAT LOGISTICS AND SERVICES OF THE AIR FORCES AND PVO". THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION IN VIENNA THAT THIS DEFINITION MIGHT BE TAKEN, DEPENDING ON INTERPRETATION, TO NECESSITATE THE TRANSFER OF WP LOGISTIC AND SERVICES

PERSONNEL CURRENTLY COUNTED BY NATO AS ARMY PERSONNEL, TO AIR FORCES. NEVERTHELESS, THIS APPROACH MIGHT LATER BE EXPLOITED: AND IS THEREFORE DISCUSSED BELOW.

4. THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED ARE:
 - A. THE CHANGES IN THE NUMBERS OF REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES BY BOTH SIDES.
 - B. THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGES ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT BEARING IN MIND THAT THE WP MAY REFUSE TO AGREE THE ESTIMATES OF WP MANPOWER ATTRIBUTED TO THEM BY NATO AND INSIST IN THE USE IN NEGOTIATIONS OF LOWER WP MANPOWER FIGURES.
 - C. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE EFFECTS ON ALLIED SECURITY.
 - D. ANY FACTORS, DERIVING FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHANGES, BEARING ON ALLIED CONCEPTS OF VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

REVIEW

5. THE WP DEFINITION AT PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE, ELABORATED IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION VIENNA, WOULD INVOLVE, USING NATO AGREED DATA:

- A. EXCLUSION FROM WP GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR OF PERSONNEL (42,000) SERVING IN CSSR AND POLISH NATIONAL AREA AIR DEFENCE ORGNAISATIONS.
- B. INCLUSION IN WP GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR OF PERSONNEL SERVING IN HELICOPTER UNITS (18,000).
- C. INCLUSION IN NATO GROUND FORCES (TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR) OF:

(1) CERTAIN PERSONNEL (2,000) OF BE, FRG, NL AND UK AIR

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FORCES, SERVING IN HELICOPTER UNITS.

(2) FRG PERSONNEL OF THE AIR FORCE MANNING SSM (PERSHING) (3,700 ROUNDED TO 4,000).

6. A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION OF TERRITORIAL (I.E. AREA) AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL (SEE PARAGRAPH 2A. ABOVE) COULD INVOLVE THE TRANSFER FROM GROUND FORCES TO AIR FORCES OF ALL PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN AREA AIR DEFENCE OPERATIONS WHO ARE NOT UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF GROUND FORCE FORMATION COMMANDERS. UNDER THIS VERSION OF THE DEFINITION, 10,800 SOVIET PERSONNEL OPERATING OR SUPPORTING SA 2/3 WEAPON SYSTEMS AND 14,000 NATO PERSONNEL OPERATING SIMILAR WEAPON SYSTEMS WITH AN AREA AIR DEFENCE TASK WOULD HAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM GROUND TO AIR FORCES, IN ADDITION TO THE CSSR AND POLISH NATIONAL AREA AIR DEFENCE ORGANISATION PERSONNEL SPECIFIED BY THE WP IN PARA 5A. ABOVE. EXCLUDING THE CZECH AND POLISH PERSONNEL, THE REMAINING NUMBER OF WP PERSONNEL (10,800) IS, HOWEVER, BROADLY THE SAME AS THE NATO EQUIVALENT NUMBER (14,000), SO THE LATTER'S INCLUSION WOULD NOT AFFECT THE IMPLICATIONS, OTHER THAN NUMERICALLY, OF ADOPTING A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION FOR MBFR PURPOSES. THESE OTHER WP AND NATO AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL ARE NOT, THEREFORE, CONSIDERED FURTHER IN THIS PAPER.

7. THESE POSSIBLE CHANGES, EXCEPT 5C.(1) ABOVE WERE DISCUSSED BY THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IN MID-1974, ON THE BASIS OF THE DATA THEN ACCEPTED BY NATO, UNDER CASES 1 AND 4 EXAMINED IN THE WORKING GROUP REPORT OF 17 SEPTEMBER, 1974.

EFFECTS FOR AIR FORCES

8. THE NUMERICAL EFFECT OF THE CHANGES PROPOSED (PARA 5 ABOVE) BY THE WARSAW PACT FOR AIR FORCES WOULD BE(1):

(P PLUS, M MINUS)	END-1974 FIGURES MID-1974	
	ASSESSMENTS	
	AC/276-D(75)2	
	NATO	WP
A. STRENGTH	193,000	208,000
B. ASSIGN AREA AIR DEF		
PERSONNEL TO AIR		P 42,000(2)
C. ASSIGN HELICOPTER	M 2,000	M 18,000(2)
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PERSONNEL TO GRD

D. ASSIGN SSM PERSONNEL TO GRD M 4,000

E. RESIDUAL PERSONNEL	187,000	232,000
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FOOTNOTES:

(1) IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS THE ASSESSED STRENGTH OF PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS GIVEN FOR MID-1974 FROM MCM-86-74. ALTHOUGH THERE IS AVAILABLE IN NATO AN AGREED ASSESSMENT OF PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS AS OF END-1974, THE BREAKDOWN OF THOSE TOTALS IS NOT YET NATO AGREED. THEREFORE THE END-1974 TOTALS ON PACT FORCES ARE NOT USED IN THIS PAPER. FOR NATO THE LATEST END-1974 FIGURES ARE USED FROM AC/276(MBFR DATE)-WP(75)4.

(2) THE NUMBERS ARE BASED ON PRESENT NATO ASSESSMENTS. THE NUMBERS COULD CHANGE IF THE PACT WERE TO EXPLOIT THE POINT MADE IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

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THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF THE TWO SIDES, ON ALLIED ASSESSMENTS, WOULD THUS BE 45,000. IF, HOWEVER, ALL PACT AND NATO HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WERE TO BE ASSIGNED TO AIR, NATO WOULD HAVE 19,000 MORE AIR (EXCLUDING SOME FRENCH BECAUSE THEIR NUMBER IS NOT KNOWN), AND THE PACT 18,000 MORE. THUS NATO WOULD HAVE 206,000 AIR AND THE PACT 250,000 AIR. THE DISPARITY WOULD THEN BE 44,000, RATHER THAN 15,000 AS CURRENTLY ASSESSED.

9. ONE ALLIED ARGUMENT FOR NOT ADDRESSING AIR FORCES IN MBFR FOR REDUCTIONS-THAT THEY ARE BROADLY EQUAL IN NUMBERS- WOULD BE ERODED.

EFFECTS FOR GROUND FORCES

10. FOR GROUND FORCES MANPOWER, THE NUMERICAL EFFECT OF THE CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT WOULD BE(1):

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GROUND FORCES MANPOWER

END 73 END 74 MID 74

NATO WP NATO WP

A. ASSESSED STRENGTH 777,000 925,000 791,000 937,000

B. ALLOCATE CZ/POL

AREA AIR DEF PERS

TO AIR M 42,000(2) M 42,000(2)

C. ALLOCATE HELI-

COPTER PERS TO P 2,000 P 18,000(2) P 2,000 P 18,000(2)

GROUND FORCES

D. ALLOCATE TAC SSM

TO GRD FORCES P 4,000 P 4,000

E. RESIDUAL ASSESSED

STRENGTH OF GRD 783,000 901,000 797,000 913,000

FORCES

F. ASSESSED DISPARITY

PRE-ADJUSTMENTS (AT	148,000	146,000
XXX B-D		
G. DISPARITY POST-		
ADJUSTMENTS	118,000	116,000

(1) SEE FOOTNOTE (1) ON PAGE 3

(2) THE NUMBERS ARE BASED ON PRESENT NATO ASSESSMENTS. THE NUMBERS COULD CHANGE IF THE PACT WERE TO EXPLOIT THE POINT MADE IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

IF ALL PACT AND NATO HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WERE TO BE ASSIGNED TO AIR, NATO WOULD HAVE 19,000 LESS GROUND (EXCLUDING SOME FRENCH BECAUSE THEIR NUMBER IS NOT KNOWN) AND THE PACT 18,000. THUS NATO WOULD HAVE 778,000 GROUND AND THE PACT 895,000 GROUND PERSONNEL. THE DISPARITY WOULD THEN BE 117,000.

11. THE NET EFFECT WOULD BE TO INCREASE THE ALLIED GROUND MANPOWER COUNT BY 6,000 AND TO REDUCE THE WP GROUND MANPOWER COUNT BY 24,000; THEREBY REDUCING THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES BY 30,000. IT WILL BE NOTED (PARA 10 ABOVE) THAT THE DISPARITIES REDUCE THUS:

DATE OF ALLIED ESTIMATE	DISPARITIES REDUCE
FROM	TO
A. NOVEMBER 1973	148,000 118,000
B. END-1974 NATO: MID-1974 PACT	146,000 116,000

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12. IF, AS PRESCRIBED IN C-(73)83(FINAL), ALLIED REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES DO NOT EXCEED 10PCT, THE INCREASE IN ALLIED REDUCTIONS CONSEQUENT ON THIS REDEFINITION WOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIAL: APPROXIMATELY 600 (10PCT OF THE 6,000 MEN ADDED TO THE ALLIED MANPOWER STRENGTH). ALLIED REQUIREMENT FOR A COMMON CEILING COULD NOT BE SET BELOW 717,000 FOR GROUND MANPOWER, (I.E. BASED ON A MAXIMUM 10PCT REDUCTION FROM END-74 ALLIED GROUND MANPOWER STRENGTH OF 797,000).

13. FOR THE WARSAW PACT, THE NUMBER OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS REQUIRED WOULD REDUCE ON TWO COUNTS:

- A. BY 24,000, ASSIGNED TO AIR FORCES.
 - B. BY A FURTHER 17,000, CONSEQUENT ON RAISING OF THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE FROM 700,000.
- THE REDUCTIONS REQUIRED OF THE WARSAW PACT WOULD BE:
- C. (913,000 - 717,000) EQUALS 196,000.

14. A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND MANPOWER WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED, AT A LEVEL OF ALLIED REDUCTIONS (100:5) TOLERABLE TO THE ALLIES IN CONSIDERATION OF THE RECIPROCAL WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS. THE WARSAW PACT WOULD REDUCE GROUND MANPOWER, AS COMPARED WITH NATO, ON A RATIO OF APPROXIMATELY 2.5:1. HOWEVER, THE REDIFINITION OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES WOULD MEAN THAT THE NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS TO BE MADE BY THE PACT TO REACH A COMMON CEILING WOULD BE REDUCED BY 41,000. THIS COULD

DECREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THE IMPACT OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ON THE MAIN WP GROUND COMBAT ELEMENTS: AND DIMINISH THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE REDUCTIONS WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT WARSAW PACT COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE NGA AND, IN PARTICULAR, DIMINISH THE CURRENT DISPARITY BETWEEN THE NUMBERS OF NATO AND WP DIVISIONS IN THE NGA.

15. ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTS OF REDEFINITION ARE CRITICALLY DEPENDENT ON THE ACCURACY OF ALLIED ESTIMATES OF WARSAW PACT MANPOWER. IN THAT RESPECT, ALTHOUGH THE NATO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS NOT MADE ANY ESTIMATE OF A POSSIBLE MARGIN OF ERROR, THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TAKE THE VIEW THAT IT COULD BE AS HIGH AS 10PCT. THE EFFECTS OF MARGINS OF ERROR AT 10PCT AND 5LPCT ARE ILLUSTRATED BELOW: BASED ON ALLIED ESTIMATES AS AT MID-74.

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MARGIN OF ERROR

10PCT	913,000-(10PCT)	91,000	EQUALS	822,000	COMMON	REDUCTIONS
		AT 717,000		105,000		
5PCT	913,000-(5PCT)	45,500	EQUALS	867,500	COMMON	CEILING 15,500
		AT 717,000				

16. THE EFFECTS OF MARGINS OF ERROR AT 10PCT AND 5PCT ON THE ASSESSED DISPARITY BETWEEN THE REDEFINED GROUND FORCES MANPOWER WOULD BE:

	WP	NATO	DISPARITY
A. AT 10PCT	913,000	- 91,000	EQUALS 822,000 797,000 25,000
B. AT 5PCT	913,000	- 45,500	EQUALS 867,500 797,000 70,500

17. ASSUMING ALLIED OBJECTIVES FOR PHASE I WERE IMPLEMENTED (INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL OF 29,000 US SOLDIERS AND 68,000 USSR SOLDIERS) REDUCTIONS REQUIRED TO REACH A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE 2 AT 717,000 WOULD BE, USING THE MID-74 ALLIED ESTIMATE OF PACT STRENGTH:

MARGIN OF ERROR

IN ALLIED ESTIMATE	FOR THE ALLIES	FOR THE WP
A. AT 10PCT	51,000	37,000
B. AT 5PCT	51,000	82,500

IMPLICATIONS OF REDEFINITION FOR A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING

18. A COMBINED GROUND/ AIR COMMON CEILING, ADOPTED ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSED DEFINITION OF FORCES, COULD BE CALCULATED BY ADDING 187,000 (REDEFINED ALLIED AIR FORCE MANPOWER) TO 717,000 (MINIMUM ALLIED GROUND MANPOWER AT 10PCT REDUCTION), I.E. 904,000, I. E. ABOUT 900,000.

19. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AIR FORCES WILL NOT BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS, THE NUMBERS OF GROUND PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS BY THE WP TO REACH A COMBINED COMMON CEILING OF ABOUT 900,000

ACCEPTABLE TO NATO WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY REDEFINITION.
IN FACT, THE PACT WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE BY 245,000. HOWEVER,
THOSE WP REDUCTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN FROM GROUND FORCES REDUCED
BY REDEFINITION, THAT IS 913,000 (SEE PARA 10). TO ACHIEVE
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A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING, BECAUSE THE WP AIR
MANPOWER AS REDEFINED (232,000) IS HIGHER THAN NATO'S
(187,000), THE WP RESIDUAL GROUND FORCES (668,000) WOULD
HAVE TO FALL BELOW THE RESIDUAL NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER
(717,000), BROADLY TO THE EXTENT OF THE DISPARITY (45,000)
BETWEEN ALLIED AND PACT AIR FORCE MANPOWER COUNTS.

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20. THE WORKING GROUP TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE
ANOMALIES REDRESSED IN THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL MIGHT SIMILARLY
BE REDRESSED BY COUNTING AS GROUND FORCES THOSE AIR FORCE
ELEMENTS OF SOME ALLIED FORCES WHICH PERFORM TASKS CARRIED
OUT BY GROUND FORCES IN OTHER ALLIED FORCES AND BY MOST WP
FORCES. THE ONLY SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENT ON THE ALLIED SIDE IN
THIS CATEGORY IS THE FRG AREA AIR DEFENCE (SAM) COMPONENT,
AMOUNTING TO 29,000 MEN. UNDER THAT ARRANGEMENT, TO ACHIEVE
A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 THE WP
REDUCTIONS WOULD REMAIN, ON ALLIED MANPOWER ESTIMATES, AT
245,000. IF THERE WERE NO AIR REDUCTIONS BY EITHER SIDE THE

RESIDUAL GROUND MANPOWER FOR THE WP WOULD BE 682,000. FOR NATO, THE RESIDUAL GROUND MANPOWER WOULD BE 736,000 (INCLUDING THE 29,000 SAM PERSONNEL TRANSFERRED TO GROUND).

21. THE OUTCOME EITHER OF THE WP PROPOSAL (PARA 19 ABOVE) OR OF THE CONVERSE APPROACH (PARA 20) WOULD CLEARLY LIE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE STATED ALLIED OBJECTIVES, WHICH SEEK (INTER SECRET

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ALIA) APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. A PROPOSAL HAVING THAT EFFECT COULD BE HELD TO NULLIFY THE EFFECTS OF REDEFINITION.

OTHER EFFECTS OF THE DEFINITION

22. THE CSSR AND POLISH AREA AIR DEFENCE TROOPS, WHO WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE AIR FORCE COUNT UNDER THE WP DEFINITION CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO THE SECURITY OF SOVIET AND OTHER PACT FORCES MOVING FORWARD FROM THE REAR TO THE WEST IN TIMES OF WAR. THEY ALSO WOULD PROTECT AIRFIELDS AND OTHER MILITARY OBJECTS WHICH NATO IN TIMES OF WAR MIGHT WANT TO ATTACK FROM THE AIR. HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO THE GROUND FORCE CONFRONTATION AND, IN PARTICULAR, DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE MOBILE, ARMORED (TANK) THREAT WHICH THE ALLIES MOST WISH TO REDUCE. THE TRANSFER OF THESE ELEMENTS TO THE AIR FORCE COUNT WOULD NOT ERODE THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF REDUCING THAT CONFRONTATION. CONVERSELY, THE HELICOPTERS AND THEIR OPERATING AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL WHO WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE WP GROUND FORCES COUNT DO, IN PART, CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF WP GROUND COMBAT FORMATIONS: IF THE WP DEFINITION WERE ACCEPTED, THESE HELICOPTER PERSONNEL WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR. AT PRESENT THE ALLIES COUNT THEM AS AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. IN THESE RESPECTS, THE CHANGES IN DEFINITION PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD HAVE NO ADVERSE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS, IN THEMSELVES, FOR NATO. HOWEVER, AS INDICATED ABOVE (PARA 14), THE LOWER SCALE OF REDUCTIONS REQUIRED OF THE WP COULD BE MORE EASILY ABSORBED AND COULD REDUCE, FOR THE PACT, THE EFFECTS OF THE COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE NGA.

23. THE POINT IS MDE (PARA 3 ABOVE) THAT THE WP DEFINITION COULD BE INTERPRETED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE WP, AND THE USSR IN PARTICULAR, COULD CLAIM THAT A SLICE OF THE INTEGRATED REAR FORCES OF COMBAT LOGISTICS AND SERVICES COULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE AIR FORCES. THAT SLICE OF COURSE DOES NOT INCLUDE THE COMBAT LOGISTIC AND SERVICE PERSONNEL OF THE PACT AIR FORCES ALREADY COUNTED BY NATO AS AIR (23PCT OF THE TOTAL PACT AIR STRENGTH). IT WOULD INVOLVE OTHER PACT PERSONNEL, PRESENTLY COUNTED BY NATO AS GROUND SUPPORTING BOTH THE PACT ARMY AND AIR FORCE. THERE IS NO AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE TO INDICATE HOW MANY MEN SECRET

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THE WP MIGHT CLAIM AS FALLING UNDER THIS HEADING. TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE LOW MANPOWER TO AIRCRAFT RATIO IN THE PACT AND ESPECIALLY IN THE SOVIET AIR FORCES, THE WORKING GROUP THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT THE PACT MIGHT PUT THE NUMBER AT 20,000 TO 30,000 OR EVEN MORE. WITHOUT AN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE SUCH A CLAIM WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REFUTE. IT IS TRUE THAT ON THE NATO SIDE SOME GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL COULD BE RECATEGORISED AS AIR BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE NATO AIR FORCES. HOWEVER, THE NATO NUMBER INVOLVED WOULD BE MUCH SMALLER THAN THE NUMBER WHICH THE WP MIGHT CLAIM TO BE APPLICABLE TO WP FORCES.

24. THERE IS, AS SAID IN PARA 3, NO INDICATION THAT THE WP INTEND TO EXPLOIT THIS LOOPHOLE. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP NEVERTHERLESS BELIEVES THAT IT COULD BE EXPLOITED AND THAT THIS PROBABLY WOULD ONLY BECOME CLEAR WHEN THE WARSAW PACT TABLES ITS AIR MANPOWER FIGURES ON FORCES OF COMBAT LOGISTIC AND SERVICES FOR THE AIR FORCE, INCLUDING PVOS. THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY, WHICH IF USED WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE MANPOWER DISPARITY BETWEEN ALLIED AND PACT GROUND MANPOWER: AND SIMILARLY FURTHER REDUCE THE NUMBER OF GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS REQUIRED BY THE PACT UNDER A COLLECTIVE GROUND COMMON CEILING.

25. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP BELIEVES THAT A DEFINITION, BASED ON THE UNIFORM PRINCIPLE FOR ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL, REMAINS FOR

NATO THE MOST PRACTICAL WAY OF DEFINING FORCES. IT IS COMPREHENSIVE, THE EASIEST TO VERIFY AND PLAYS DOWN THE EQUIPMENT ISSUE. FURTHERMORE, THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH COULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE PACT IN THEIR CONTINUING PRESSURE TO ADDRESS ARMAMENTS FOR REDUCTIONS. 90 PCT OF THE FORCES OF BOTH ISDES CAN BE CATEGORISED IN AN UNDISPUTABLE WAY UNDER THAT DEFINITION. THE REMINING 10 PCT COULD BE ACCEPTED AS AN EXCEPTION AND CATEFORISED UNDER A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH. BEFORE ACCEPTING SUCH A RECATAGORISATION NATO WOULD NEED, HOWEVER, TO BE ASSURED BY THE PACT THAT THE ONLY THREE CATEGORIES INVOLVED ARE THE THREE ADDRESSED IN THIS PAPER, AND THAT IN NUMERICAL TERMS THE EFFECTS ARE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS CALCULATED BY NATO. ACCEPTANCE OF A DEFINITION, BASED ON AN ENUMERATION OF FUNCTIONAL TYPES OF FORCES, WOULD LEAD TO ACCEPTANCE OF AN OUTCOME WHICH IS UNPREDICTABLE (SEE PARA 23)

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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SECUTIRY IMPLICATIONS

26. IT FOLLOWS FROM THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE, MILITARILY, TO MAINTAIN THE ALLIED APPROACH TO DEFINITION OF FORCES, I.E. ON THE BASIS OF UNIFORM. EXCEPTIONS TO THAT DEFINITION COULD BE MADE, TO RECOGNISE THE SPECIFIC ANOMALOUS ELEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS (AS AT PARA 5 ABOVE) AND TO TRANSFER THESE BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR AS APPROPRIATE. THESE TRANSFERS, IN TOTAL, WOULD DIMINISH THE GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS REQUIRED OF THE WARSAW PACT UNDER THE EXISTING ALLIED APPROACH: THAT CHANGE IN SCLAE OF REDUCTIONS WOULD REDUCE ALLIED PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING MAXIMUM REDUCTIONS OF WARSAW PACT COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA.

27. IT IS ALSO NOTED THAT:

A. ADOPTION OF THE WARSAW PACT REDEFINITION APPROACH WOULD
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ERODE THE ALLIED ARGUMENT THAT AIR FORCE PERSONNEL SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS BECAUSE NUMBERS ON BOTH SIDES ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL.

B. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES PERSONNEL WOULD BE REDUCED BY 30,000: AND POSSIBLY SUBSTANTIALLY MORE.

VERIFICATION

28. THE VERIFICATION EFFECTS OF REDEFINITION OF FORCES ON A BASIS SIMILAR TO THAT UNDER DISCUSSION WERE EXAMINED BY THE WORKING GROUP IN MID-1974(1). THE FINDINGS OF THAT STUDY REMAIN VALID. AS INDICATED, THE WORKING GROUP FORESEES SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTY IN VERIFYING RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS OF MANPOWER. THE TASK WOULD BE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY A NEED TO IDENTIFY PERSONNEL WEARING THE SAME UNIFORM BUT PERFORMING FUNCTIONS WHICH WOULD CATEGORISE THEM AS AIR FORCE PERSONNEL.

FOOTNOTE: (1) AC/276-D(74)8

NON-CIRCUMVENTION

29. THE RECATEGORISATION OF CZECH AND POLISH AREA AIR DEFENCE PERSONNEL FROM GROUND TO AIR WOULD, AS COMPARED WITH THE EXISTING NATO CONCEPT(2) PROVIDE NO ADDITIONAL OPENING FOR CIRCUMVENTION PROVIDED THAT THOSE FORCES WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SOME FORCE LIMITATION OR OTHER FORMULATION. THE RECATEGORISATION OF SOVIET HELICOPTER PERSONNEL FROM AIR TO GROUND WOULD PROVIDE NO OPENING FOR CIRCUMVENTION OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT.

FINDINGS

30 THE WORKING GROUP FIND THAT REDEFINITION OF FORCES ON THE LINES OF THE WP PROPOSAL WOULD:

A. BY CREATING A SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITY BETWEEN THE MANPOWER COUNTS OF NATO AND WP AIR FORCES, ERODE ONE ALLIED ARGUMENT FOR NOT ADDRESSING AIR FORCES IN MBFR. (PARA9)

B. REDUCE THE NUMBER OF WP GROUND FORCES ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS, AND REDUCE THE ASSESSED DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES GROUND MANPOWER STRENGTHS. (PARAS 11-13)
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C. REDUCE THE WP GROUND FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR BY 24,000 ON THE BASIS OF THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS ALREADY PROPOSED BY THE WP (TERRITORIAL AIR DEFENCE: HELICOPTER: TACTICAL SSM). (PARAS 2 & 10)
FOOTNOTE: (1) C-M(73)83(FINAL)

D. PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR THE WP TO CLAIM THAT A SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL NUMBER (PERHAPS BETWEEN 20 AND 30,000) OF WP PERSONNEL COUNTED BY NATO AS GROUND, SHOULD BE ASSIGNED FUNCTIONALLY TO AIR: AND THUS FURTHER REDUCE THE WP GROUND PERSONNEL TO BE ADDRESSED IN MBFR AND FURTHER REDUCE THE ASSESSED DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES. (K PARA 23)

31. THE WORKING GROUP FURTHER FIND THAT:

A. IT WOULD STILL BE TECHNICALLY PRACTICABLE, WITH FORCES REDEFINED AS PROPOSED BY THE WP, TO REACH A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES (AT ABOUT 717,000 RESTRICTING THE ALLIED

REDUCTIONS TO 10 PCT) INVOLVING ASYMMETRIC GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS
ON THE RATION OF 2.5:1 (WP:NATO). HOWEVER, (PARA 14)
THE WP WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY LESS MANPOWER
(AT LEAST 41,000 LESS) THAN ENVISAGED IN CURRENT ALLIED PRO-
POSALS. THIS COULD DIMINISH THE IMPACT OF REDUCTIONS ON WP
COMBAT CAPABILITY IN THE NGA.

B. ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTS OF REDEFINITION ARE
ESSENTIALLY DEPENDENT ON THE VALIDITY OF ALLIED ESTIMATES OF
WP MANPOWER. UNTIL THE ALLIANCE CAN BE ASSESSED (PARA 15)
ON THE SCOPE OF REDEFINITION AND THAT THE FIGURES ARE ACCURATE,
OR IS PROVIDED BY THE WP WITH ALTERNATIVES, THE MILITARY SECURITY
EFFECTS OF REDEFINITION CANNOT BE ASSESSED WITH CONFIDENCE.

C. IT WOULD BE GREATLY PREFERABLE, MILITARILY TO
MAINTAIN THE PRINCIPLE THE PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH TO DEFINITION
OF FORCES. SPECIFIC
ANOMALIES COULD BE RECOGNISED AND ADJUSTED, IF APPROPRIATE, AFTER
EACH HAD BEEN QUALIFIED NUMERICALLY. (PARA 25)

D. REDEFINITION ON THE WP BASIS WOULD MAKE IT
EXTERMELY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPRACTICABLE, TO ENVISAGE
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ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMBINED GROUND/AIR COMMON CEILING WHICH
COULD BE NEGOTIABLE AND MEET ALLIED REQUIREMENTS. (PARA 21)

E. THE TASK OF VERIFICATION OF RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS
WOULD BE MORE COMPLICATED THAN IS THE CASE UNDER PRESENT
ALLIED APPROACH TO DEFINITION OF FORCES. IN NEITHER CASE,
HOWEVER, COULD VERIFICATION OF RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS
BE GUARANTEED. (PARA 28)

END TEXT OF DRAFT STUDY ON FORCE REDUCTIONSTREATOR

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